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Abstract 
This paper presents the Speech Technology Center (STC) 
systems submitted to Automatic Speaker Verification 
Spoofing and Countermeasures (ASVspoof) Challenge 2015. 
In this work we investigate different acoustic feature spaces to 
determine reliable and robust countermeasures against 
spoofing attacks. In addition to the commonly used front-end 
MFCC features we explored features derived from phase 
spectrum and features based on applying the multiresolution 
wavelet transform. Similar to state-of-the-art ASV systems, we 
used the standard TV-JFA approach for probability modelling 
in spoofing detection systems.  Experiments performed on the 
development and evaluation datasets of the Challenge 
demonstrate that the use of phase-related and wavelet-based 
features provides a substantial input into the efficiency of the 
resulting STC systems. In our research we also focused on the 
comparison of the linear (SVM) and nonlinear (DBN) 
classifiers.. 
Index Terms: spoofing, anti-spoofing, speaker recognition, 
phase spectrum, cos-phase, wavelet transform, TV, SVM, 
DBN 
1. Introduction 
Information technology plays an increasingly large role in 
today’s world, and different authentication methods, including 
voice biometrics, are used for restricting access to 
informational resources. Examples of speaker recognition 
systems usage include internet banking systems, customer 
identification during a call to a call center, as well as passive 
identification of a possible criminal using a preset “blacklist” 
[1], [2]. Due to the importance of the information that needs to 
be protected, requirements for biometric systems are high, 
including robustness against potential break-ins and other 
attacks. 
Performance of basic technologies in voice biometrics has 
greatly improved in recent years. For instance, the latest 
overviews of speaker recognition systems showed that EER is 
down to 1.5-2% for text-independent [3] and down to 1% for 
text-dependent [4] speaker recognition systems in various 
conditions. 
With the growth of interest in reliable ASV systems, the 
development of their spoofing techniques increased 
tremendously [1]. A multitude of different spoofing methods 
was proposed in literature. For example, [5] describes methods 
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based on “Replay attack”, “Cut and paste”, “Handkerchief 
tampering” and “Nasalization tampering”. Speech synthesis 
approaches [6] are also widely used for spoofing purposes. 
Despite the development of new spoofing detection 
methods, most of ASV spoofing countermeasures presented so 
far are dependent on a training dataset related to a specific 
type of attack, while the nature of the spoofing attack is 
usually unknown in real practice. Several papers on the ASV 
system robustness evaluation against spoofing attacks [5], [7], 
[8] show that it is highly important to develop new anti-
spoofing techniques to detect unforeseen spoofing attacks 
when details of the spoofing attacks are unknown, in order to  
keep the required EER level. That was the motivation for 
organizing the ASVspoof Challenge 2015 [9] where spoofing 
detection methods for known [1] and unknown spoofing types 
were evaluated. ASVspoof  Challenge 2015 was focused on a 
stand-alone spoofing detection task. 
In this paper we describe several spoofing detection 
systems that were proposed for the ASVspoof Challenge 2015. 
For participation in the challenge we used the standard 
Total Variability Joint Factor Analysis (TV-JFA) approach for 
statistical modelling of the acoustic features of the speech 
signal. As a classifier we applied Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) or, alternatively, Deep Belief Network (DBN). 
In the paper we concentrate on researching the most 
appropriate front-end features for the spoofing detection 
system we propose. In particular, we investigated acoustic 
features based on the phase spectrum information and features 
derived by applying the wavelet transform [10]. The aim of 
our research was to find the most effective method for 
detecting unknown spoofing attacks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 overviews all the proposed spoofing detection 
systems with a brief description of the subsystems it consists 
of. Section 3 introduces acoustic feature extraction methods in 
detail. Experimental work is described in Section 4. Finally, 
our conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2. Overall system description 
All our systems consist of three main components (Figure 1): 
• Acoustic feature extractor 
• TV i-vector extractor 
• Classifier 
After experiments on the training part of the ASVspoof 
Challenge 2015 database we decided to include pre-detection 
as a preliminary step in the spoofing detection system. The 
pre-detector checks whether the input speech signal has zero 
temporal energy values. In case of zero-sequence the signal is 
declared to be a spoofing attack, otherwise (or in case of a 
system without the pre-detection step) the speech signal is 
used as input data for the feature extractor. 
Acoustic feature extractors in our systems combine several 
different acoustic feature extraction methods. All the features 
we proposed during the ASVspoof Challenge 2015 will be 
described in details in Section 3.  
 
Figure 1: Scheme of spoofing detection system. 
The obtained feature vectors are used by the i-vector 
extractor to get i-vectors from different feature types. These i-
vectors are then concatenated in one common i-vector, which 
is centered and length-normalized. 
Finally, the classifier calculates the resulting score to 
estimate if the speech signal is a spoofing attack or not (Figure 
1). 
2.1. Total Variability Modeling 
In our work for the acoustic space modelling we used the 
standard TV-JFA approach, which is the state-of-the-art in 
speaker verification systems [3], [4], [11]. According to this 
version of the joint factor anlysis, the i-vector of the Total 
Variability space is extracted by means of JFA modification, 
which is a usual Gaussian factor analyser defined on mean 
supervectors of the Universal Background Model (UBM) and 
Total-variability matrix T. UBM is represented by the  
Gaussian mixture model of the described features. The 
diagonal covariance UBM was trained by the standard EM-
algorithm. 
2.2. SVM-Classification  
In our work we used an SVM classifier with a linear kernel. 
The separating hyperplane was trained in normalized i-vectors 
space (Figure 1) on the training part of the ASV spoof 
challenge 2015 database to detect genuine speech phonograms 
and spoofing attacks. In SVM training the efficient 
LIBLINEAR [12] library was used for calculations in order to 
achieve the necessary accuracy and computational speed. 
2.3. DBN-Classification  
Alternatively, we used a classifier based on Deep Belief 
Network with softmax output units and stochastic binary 
hidden units [13] (Figure 2). DBN takes normalized i-vectors 
from the i-vector extractor as input data. We used layer-wise 
pretreating of the layers by means of Restricted Boltzmann 
Machines (RBMs) and then applied back-propagation to train 
the DBN in a supervised way to perform classification. 
 
Figure 2: DBN-Classification. 
3. Front-End Features  
In this section we describe a number of different acoustic 
features that were effective for the ASVspoof Challenge 2015 
task. 
3.1. Amplitude spectral features 
As short-term amplitude spectrum acoustic features to be used 
in the ASV spoofing attack detection system we selected mel 
frequency coefficients. We used the discrete cosine transform 
to obtain Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coeffitients (MFCC) and 
principal component analysis to obtain Mel-Frequency 
Principal Coeffitients (MFPC). These features accurately 
represent the general characteristics of the vocal tract. 
MFCC coefficients represent the short-term power 
spectrum of the speech signal, based on the application of the 
discrete cosine transform to the log power spectrum on a 
nonlinear mel scale of frequency (Figure 3). To derive the 
MFCC coefficients we used a Hamming window function with 
the window length equal to 256 and 50% overlap. 
We kept the first 12 MFCC coefficients and their first and 
second-order derivatives as the most informative acoustic 
features, thereby obtaining a 36-length feature vector. 
 
Figure 3: MFCC feature extractor. 
The MFPC coefficients were obtained similarly to the 
MFCC coefficients, but using principal component analysis 
instead of the discrete cosine transform to achieve 
decorrelation of the informative acoustic features (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: MFPC feature extractor. 
3.2. Phase-based features 
In order to take into account phase information of the speech 
signal we used the cos-phase features described in [14]. These 
features were extracted from the phase spectrum, obtained by 
the Fourier Transform, as follows: 
1. The unwrapped phase spectrum was normalized by 
applying the cosine function to change its range to [-1; 1]. 
2. Dimensionality reduction was then performed by means of 
principal component analysis, the basis of which had been 
calculated beforehand on the training part of the 
ASVspoof Challenge 2015 database. 
Similarly to amplitude spectrum features, we selected only 
the first 12 coefficients with their first and second-order 
derivatives to form the resulting feature vector CosPhase 
Principal Coeffitients (CosPhasePC). 
 
Figure 5: CosPhasePC feature extractor. 
3.3. Wavelet-based features 
We decided to introduce detailed time-frequency analysis of 
the speech signals in our countermeasures. For this purpose we 
used front-end features based on applying the wavelet-packet 
transform [10], adapted to the mel scale (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Wavelet Packet 
Transform. TKE is a Teager 
Kaiser energy 
 
Figure 7: MWPC feature 
extractor 
Instead of the classical energy of the frequency sub-bands, 
here we applied the Teager Keiser Energy (TKE) Operator 
(Figure 6). TKE is more informative than classical sample 
energy. Moreover, it is a noise-robust parameter for speech 
signal [15]. We used the following equation for TKE 
evaluation: 
( )( ) 2Ψ ( ) ( 1) ( 1)s t s t s t s t= − − +           (1) 
where  ( )s t  is the output signal temporal sample of the 
considered sub-band. 
For extracted features decorrelation, similarly to 3.1 and 
3.2, we consistently applied principal component analysis to 
derive 12 coefficients. We called these features Mel Wavelet 
Packet Coefficients (MWPC) for short. Equivalently to 3.1 
and 3.2, here we observe MWPC with its first and second-
order derivatives (Figure 7).  
To derive the MWPC coefficients we also used a 
Hamming window function with the window length equal to 
256 and 50% overlap. 
4. Experiments 
For training all parameters of our anti-spoofing systems we 
used training dataset. All the experiments, described below, 
were performed on the development dataset. According to the 
challenge conditions [9], the training and development 
datasets contained 5 spoofing attacks of types S1-S5: S1,S2,S5 
were voice conversion algorithms and S3, S4 were HMM-
based speaker-adapted speech synthesis methods. 
For example, Figure 8 presents LDA projections of the 
MWPC based i-vectors for the subset of the development 
dataset on the 3 principal components P1, P2, P3, evaluated on 
the training dataset. In our experiments we used Daubechies 
wavelets db4 for wavelet transform. 
 
Figure 8: The LDA projections of MWPC based  
i-vectors on principal components P1, P2, P3. 
In Figure 8 we can see that that human class is well 
separated from the spoofing classes. This allows us to argue 
that integration of SVM linear classification methods can be 
efficient for solving the spoofing detection task in this space. 
Note that in this feature space 3 groups of spoofing classes can 
also be easily discriminated: G1 is the group of HMM-based 
speech synthesis (S3+S4); G2 is the group of simple Voice 
conversion techniques (S1+S2); G3 represents Festvox voice 
conversion method. 
Table 1 demonstrates resulting EER estimates (%) of the 
TV-SVM based system with different front-end features, 
described in Section 3, obtained on the development dataset. 
These results were obtained with the use of 256-component 
UBM and 200 dimensional i-vector. 
Table 1. Experimental results for the TV-SVM systems for 
different types of spoofing algorithms, EER (%). 
Features 
Spoofing algorithm 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 All 
MFCC 0.38 2.13 0.36 0.39 1.48 1.14 
MFPC 0.13 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.37 0.23 
CosPhasePC 0.13 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.15 
MWPC 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.05 
The results show that standard MFCC features are inferior 
in comparison with other front-end features by EER estimates. 
It should be mentioned that substantial EER improvement was 
achieved on MFPC for all spoofing techniques by PCA basis 
applying in MFCC instead of discrete cosine transform. 
CosPhasePC implementation slightly reduces EER compared 
with MFPC. Features based on the multiresolution wavelet 
transform outperform all other proposed features, reaching 
0.05% EER for all known attacks. Note that during our 
experiments we determined that using the TKE operator in 
MWPC demonstrates better results than classical energy. 
4.1. Fusion 
In this work we explored fusion of systems based on different 
front-end features in the i-vector space. All i-vectors derived 
from different extractors were concatenated in one common i-
vector, as shown in Figure 1. Results for different fusion 
systems confirm that for all combinations of features EER 
estimations for known spoofing attacks are close to 0%. 
However, the zero error of spoofing detection for the 
development dataset was achieved only by implementing the 
combination of CosPhasePC and MWPC features. 
4.2. Classifiers 
Experiments of the fused TV systems with the combination of 
MFCC, MFPC and CosPhasePC feature extractors based on 
SVM and DBN classifiers showed that SVM-based system 
achieved 0.03% EER on the development dataset, which is 
better than 0.04% EER of DBN-based system.  
5. Evaluation results 
Based on the results of our experiments on the development 
dataset, we decided to propose 3 systems according to the 
common condition of the ASVspoof Challenge 2015. 
Our Primary system was implemented according to the 
scheme on Figure 1 with a pre-detection step and MFCC, 
MFPC and CosPhasePC as acoustic features. The UBM was 
represented by a 1024-component Gaussian mixture model of 
the described features, and the dimension of the TV space was 
400. Here we used SVM for classification. 
In our Contrastive 1 system a pre-detector was not used, 
and MWPC features were used instead of MFCC. 
Our third system Contrastive 2 also did not use a pre-
detector and applied a nonlinear DBN classifier. In order to 
avoid overfitting, we reduced the UBM component number to 
256 for all feature types and the TV space dimension to 200. 
In addition to known spoofing attacks, the evaluation 
dataset contained spoofing attacks of 5 unknown types S6-S10 
[16]. Table 2 presents the evaluation results. 
Table 2. Evaluation  results of the STC systems, EER (%). 
System Known attacks 
Unknown 
attacks All 
Primary 0.008 3.922 1.965 
Contrastive 1 0.009 4.891 2.450 
Contrastive 2 0.017 6.162 3.090 
Primary (no pre-detection) 0.008 5.151 2.579 
In spite of the good results of the STC systems for known 
attacks, results obtained for unknown attacks are much worse: 
our best primary system reached 3.92% EER. This observation 
suggests the necessity to improve countermeasures to achieve 
robust performance on unknown attacks. 
The primary system showed the best results, in particular 
due to the energy pre-detection step. To confirm this 
suggestion we compared this result with EER for primary 
system without pre-detector (Table 2). This pre-detector will 
not be useful in case of channel effects or additive noise. That 
is a significant limitation of this anti-spoofing system. 
Unlike the Primary system, the Contrastive 1 system did 
not use the pre-detector and demonstrated relatively good 
performance according to the challenge results. We see the 
reason for that in the MWPC features. The advantage of these 
features is the wavelet-transform, which makes it possible to 
produce detailed multiresolution signal analysis. That provides 
an additional decrease of EER in the spoofing detection task. 
Results for the Contrastive 2 system with DBN classifier, 
turned out to be the worst. In this system we probably failed to 
avoid the effects of the stronger overfitting on these training 
dataset, in comparison with SVM. According to the results it 
can be suggested that it is better to use linear SVM classifier in 
the proposed system (Figure 1). 
In Table 3 the evaluation EER results for each spoofing 
type are introduced. It can be seen that results of all proposed 
systems for unknown spoofing types S6-S9 and for known 
types S1-S5 are comparable. But for S10() EER results of all   
our systems are several orders greater. That affects 
dramatically the overall EER evaluation results. 
Table 3. Evaluation results for STC systems for different types 
of spoofing algorithms, EER (%). 
Spoofing 
 algorithm 
System 
Primary Contrastive 1 Contrastive 2 
S1 0.004  0.005  0.000  
S2 0.022 0.022 0.058 
S3 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S4 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S5 0.013 0.020 0.029 
S6 0.019 0.024 0.046 
S7 0.000 0.007 0.000 
S8 0.015 0.014 0.124 
S9 0.004 0.006 0.005 
S10 19.571 24.401 30.636 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we produce comprehensive investigation of the 
feature spaces applicability and effectiveness of different 
classifiers in solution of the spoofing detection task for 
ASVspoof Challenge 2015. The submitted STC systems were 
based on TV modelling in the space of different features and a 
linear SVM-based classifier or a nonlinear DBN-based 
classifier.  
During our research we tested different front-end features, 
including features derived from phase spectrum and features 
obtained by applying wavelet-transform, in order to determine 
reliable and robust countermeasures in the anti-spoofing task. 
Experiments performed on the datasets of the Challenge 
demonstrate that using phase-based and wavelet-based 
features provides a substantial input into the efficiency of the 
resulting STC systems. Our best result on the evaluation 
dataset is 1.965% EER for all spoofing attacks. 
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